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State of Utah, ( S a l t Lake City
Corooration),
Plaintiff/Respondent

APPELLATE NO. 330489-CA
CRIMINAL NO. 33023051TC

vs
Jerry McKinley Armstrong,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgement and conviction f o r d r i v i n g under the influence and
d r i v i n g without a d r i v i n g l i c e n s e , both being misdemeanors, i n v i o l a t i o n of
A r t i c l e 5, C o n s t i t u t i o n of the State of Utah - section 41-6-44, i n the f i f t h
C i r c u i t Court i n and f o r S a l t Lake C i t y , State of Utah, the Honorable Shirley
McCleve, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Jerry McKinley Armstronq
Pro Se
Utah State Prison # 15774
Post Office Box 250
Draoer, Utah 84020
Rodger Cutler and
Richard G. Hamp
Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f
Salt Lake City Prosecutors
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: 535-7767
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction of this honorable Court is invoked pursuant to Amendment
5, and 14, Constitution of the United States of America, Article 5, Section
41-5-44, Subsection (1) and (2), Constitution of the State of Utah, Rule 2
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and farther jurisdiction is conferred
on this Court pursuant it's own Rules, Rule 24 and 27, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals whereby a defendant in a cause may take an aooeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals from a final judqement and conviction had in a lower
Court.
In this case final judqement and conviction was rendered bv the
honorable Shirley McCleve, Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for
Salt Lake City, Utah, State of Utah (Traffic Division).
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an apoeal found from a judgement determined by the Honorable
Shirley McCleve, Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
The Judge found the aopellant guilty of driving under the influence and
driving without a driving license, both misdemeanors, and in violation of
Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah - section 41-6-44, after a trial
held on 32 tif July, 1933.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On approximately June 12 or 13, 1938, at aooroximatelv 2:00 a.m., the
appellant, Sandra Bankhead, Kenney Farmer, and two other oeoole l e f t the Bunnv
Club on 17 and Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. When aopellant went to the
Club he and Mr. Farmer was togeather, which was aooroximately 10:00 or 11:00
p.m. . At statutory closing time for a l l bars in the Salt Lake City area the
appellant and Mr. Farmer was about to leave when Miss. Bankhead asked aopellant
i f he would give her and two friends a l i f t to there residences, appellant sayed
sure since he had seen Miss. Bankhead o f f and on for the oast several vears.
On the way to the place that was calculated not to be vary far from the

i 1 lustrous Bunny Club, a dangerous s i t u r a t i o n surfaced between Miss. 3ankhead
and the other lady who apoellant tought was a f r i e n d of Miss. Bankhead. They
s t a r t e d an argument that was reaching the o o i n t were bodylv threats were
being tossed about. Consequently, appellant wishinq that harm towards e i t h e r
of these i n d i v i d u a l s manifest decided the best way to handle the n a t t e r would
be to e v i c t h a l f of the argument from his automobile. So aooellant stoooed
his automobile immediately, turned on emernency flashers t h a t are factory
i n s t a l l e d j u s t f o r such emergencies, and oroceeded to attemot m i t i q a t i o n of
the argument that was e i t h e r qoing to cause damane to aooellants automobile,
or destroy one of the i n d i v i d u a l s l i f e form.
Such was the state of a f f a i r s confronting aopellant when oatroleman
Swin approached appellants automobile f r i s t from the f r o n t , and then from
the r e a r , on 12 or 13 June 1933.
As the arrest l o c a t i o n w i l l p o i n t out the place of a r r e s t was on a
r e s i d e n t i a l s t r e e t , and i t w i l l also ooint out t h a t aooellant was double
parked, w i t h flashers on. The appellant i s a professional d r i v e r with over
three-hundred thousand every type of weather and hiqhway condition coast to
coast miles d r i v i n g eighteen wheels t r a c t o r s - t r a i l e r combanations, without
exoeriencing any accidents whatsoever.
When patroleman Swin stopped behind appellants automobile the aooellant
s t a r t e d searching f o r his automobile c e r t i f i c a t i o n documents, which he found
on the sun v i s o r of the d r i v e r side of the automobile. Patroleman Swin then
put his spot l i g h t in aopellants mirrors and asked aopellant to e x i s t c a r ,
which appellant d i d , along w i t h automobile documents.This a l l happen i n the
course of approximately one minute, or even a h a l f of a minute. Arquement
was s t i l l ensuing i n appellants automobile.
Upon e x i s t i n g his automobile the appellant immediately went back to
patroleman Swin's police cruser and asked him i f he would a s s i s t him i n
m i t i g a t i n g an argument that was g e t t i n g out of hand i n his automobile. P a t r o l -

eman Swin then asked aooellant,

M

how much have you had to drink toniaht ,f?

Appellants answer was, " not much.'1 In the mean time while aonellants back
was turned to his automobile

two or three of the peonle in the car had

gotten out and was standing outside aooellants auto as aopellant observed
upon being escorted to the curb to beain takinq the field sobriety test.
Appellant must ooint out here that officer Swin never even asked one
single question concerninq the oroblems I told him

that I was havinq and

such being the same reason that aooellant was stooped in an illegal oarkinq
manner. Nor did patroleman Swin ask the young lone lady who was standing
around after everybody else had taken flight, wheather or not mv request for
helo was genuine, or wheather anybody was in an arquement or not. Aooellant
also would like to point out that Mr. Farmer, the individual who aooellant
brought to the bar with him, took flight alonq with Miss. Rankhead and the
other individual, whoes name aooellant does not know.
If aooellant had professionally tought the probability of another
motirist not seeing aopellants automobile oarked at the exact location in
which it was parked; so aooellant could address the arquement situration,
outweighed the probability

of someone getting hurt or killed as a results

of the arguement going on in appellants automobile, aopellant would have
not parked in an illegal manner. However, the arquement in appellants car
had reached very dangerous levels and apoellant, thus, applied emerqency
brakes to deal with a life and death situration.
Consequently, all the aooreciation that aooellant received was a
driving under the influence without license conviction and six months in
Utah State Prison.
The appellant is not a patroleman by oatroleman Swin's standards,
neither does he characteristically profess to know the whole personalities
of the individuals who were in his automobile that niqht in June. But
appellant does know that if someone had gotten killed why patroleman Swin's

concerns orioritys were on giving appellant a field soberity test, oatroleman
Swin would have been grossly negeligent of his official duties which he swore
to uphold upon entering the law enforcement vocation.
Before or while the appellant was takenina the field soberity test, he
told patroleman Swin that he was also takening mental hygiene medcine, and
appellant feel oatroleman Swin had the option to elect pursuance to sections
41-6-44, and 41-6-44.10, Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah, which
chemical test or test of appellants breath, blood, or urine, which best suited
the purpose of determining if appellant was statutorily orohibited from
operating his own automobile. Appellant feels that a blood test ought to
have been the factor which determined the combination of alcohol contents,
as^ determinative of the drug -joontents present in apoelants system uoon him
issuring appellant an arrest for driving under the influence. Appellant find
no fairness in the Court which allowed the admissibility of the breath analysis
test because appellant is and was on precribed mental hygiene medication. And,
41-6-44, states: " a peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid test
shall be administered."

See allegations: 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of appellants

document - "appeal for driving under the influence conviction" filed with this
Court already.
Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah, 41-6-44, subsection (1)
states: " that it is unlawful and punishable if a person have a combined
influence of drugs or alcohol greater than .08% to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, or to be in actual physical
control of such vehicle in this State."
Appellants alcohol contents, he thinks, read 104%, at the issuring of
the driving under the influence arrest.
This section states farther: " upon a second conviction within five
years after a first conviction, the Court shall impose a mandatory iail
sentence of not more than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail." The appellant admitts

to this Court that the culmination value of apoellants drivina under the
influence causes egualls two within the statutory five year time soan
prescribed by State Law. But for the sake of appellant his reasoning uoon
multiplication factors deDloyed by the 3oard of

D

ardons whoes common

denominators fact findinn criterias convenient!v allows i t to sentence
individuals, just because they are on parole, to more time than the
State Constitution reguirements s t a t u t o r i l y dictates regardino misdemeanors.
At the conclusion of serving this time, only mv second driving under the
influence in forty years of drivina, the appellant w i l l have served
exactly one f u l l year in this Prison for a combined total of two drivinn
under the influence convictions, plus meeting the other reguirements that
the highest order of Law in this state, s t a t u t o r i l y reguires. Appellant has
even stayed in the drunk tank overniaht???
Appellant has already addressed the fact that purviews of the1double
jeopardy1 clause indicated that some controversy could emerge regarding the
Constitutionality of how the rational comoonents of this States statutorv
Laws are reflected within the guidelins of Adult Probation and Parole and
the Board of Pardons, insofar as their procedures and processes which
determines a probationers, or oarolee, inconseguential infractions uoon
the States statutory Rules of Law measures, comparable to measures of
punishments prescribed for other Citizens of this State who are not clients
of their i n s t i t u t i o n s .
What, then, your honors, constitues a true and f a i r aoDrehension^of
this State'SuLaws. I t is ap violation of the Constitution of the United
States of America to discriminate against any class or race of oeoole, or
individuals. But seemingly that is precisely what the Board of Pardons does
regarding parolee. That in no form can be considered eguall protection as
the promulgators of the eguall protection clause intended.
The appellant cites Waller_ys Florida,, 397 U..S. 387,_ 25 L. ED. 2d 435,
g ^
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his already filed document: motion to vacate judgement and order pursuant
to 28 USC 2255 and 13 USC 4244. The appellant additionally aoplys 23 USCA
2254, and Rule 2, United State Code Annototed, Title 23, Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure, Section 2255.
Considering all factors present and demonstrative of the events
whoes specific fractions formed the basis differences which resulted in
appellant landing in Prison, meaning appellants arrest, within the context
of how the State of Utah Constitution discerns on " to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely drivinq a vehicle." The appellant frame this
to mean in layman terms, that a person driving a vehicle under substances
contents above the States .08% statutory alcohol level is not necessarily
'incapable of safely driving', but if he has established a drivinq oatterninq
of reckieness whereby that persons automobile is beinq controled by influences
other than that oersons normal self, then, that person is in violation of the
driving under the influence statutory laws of the State of Utah.
The elements of appellants actions, nor the elements of appellants
intentions, are determining factors which would have lead a prudent person
to believe that the appellant was, citing instant of arrest, 'incapable of
safely driving' his automobile.Because appellant was not drivinq when oatroleman Swin approached his automobile. This impass, consequently, reqardinq how
patroleman Swin reached his conclusions about appellants inability to operate
his automobile, confounds appellants far beyound his comprehension of what
the promulgators of the words arrangement 'incapable of safely drivinq a
vehicle', 'to a degree', had in mind regarding formulation o* statues which
would allow the States law enforcement arm the opportunity to apprehend the
incapable and unsafe driver.
The Federal Social Security Act, 42 USC $ 416 (i)(l), now defines
"disability" as (A) "inability to enqaqe in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable Physical or mental inoairement which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 Months: or (3) blindness'.
Appellant hereof contends that the Court of the trial instant ounht
to have ordered a hearinq determinative to the mental sufficiencv of
appellant to qrasp the handle of the intricate trial instant. Suanestive
to corresoondinq issues as to wheather aonellant should have been confined
to a hospital or orison envioronment. An individual who is functional in
a hospital setting, may not be functional in a orison settinq.
The appellant knows that he has already mention the fact that he
frames the rules of law that he has read as creatinq controversy revolvinq
the elements of this cause interdependent with freedom of speech, and due
process of law, pursuance to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States of America. Analyzinq

this imoass farther the

appellant must compare the efforts of his court appointed counsel to that
of efforts of one receivinq compensation for collective barqaininn an
individuals life away. In the instant of trial where the appellant asked
his counsel of records to subpeona all of the individuals ridinq'tn tits
automobile the night of instant of arrest, counsel told aoDellant that
what they would have to say in trial, would be'irrelevant' to aooellants
inquiry. Appellant, thus, states that his counsels conduct was unsatisfactory, and harbored controversy in light of undermininq the orooer
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial manifestations are
not reliable as having produced fair and just results. Appellant, therefore,
cites: Strickland vs Washington, 466 U. S. at 638, and 687.
It must be mention to this court that Miss. Bankhead was too a client
of the Adult Probation and Parole Departments, Utah Department of Corrections,
Intensive Supervision Program. Appellant has discovered this fact since he
landed in Prison.
Appellant would also like to inform this court at this time that his
automobile had commercial license olates. A type of plate which allows the
vehicle to park in a yellow curb, and to stnp .anywhere with proper signals.

Therefore, inasmuch as anoellant harboring touohts that his laymans
conception about the rationale and interpretations of the various rules, cases,
and statutes

cited herewithin, and hopefully conveved in light of this Court

finding different determinative factors which mav promote appellants nuest for
oroperly framed and reasonable iustice; he shall respectful!v attempt to bring
this retaliatory to a conclusion through farther conveying his lavmans side
of this coin as to wheather or not genuine orobable cause coniunctive with
illegal search and seizure raises sensational controversy renardino the instant
of arrest.
According to the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 5 - Driving
'Jhile Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, section 41-6-43, subsection (2); orobable
cause, in the instant of a oatroling oatroleman detainina an individual sunected
of driving under the influence, exists when: " an ordiance adooted by a local
authority that governs reckless driving, or driving a vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or orooerty shall be consistent with the
provisions of this code which govern those matters." (found in Utah Code 1934-35,
volume 2, Title 30-55).
Conseguently, since appellant has already stated to this Court, purviews of
section 41-5-44, which lays down the law of the Utah land regardino where and
how an individual constitutes tremor uoon this section of Utah law in regard to
driving an automobile under the influence of substance, the issue remainina
which need conveying to this Court reflects that nonewhatsoever orobable cause
was present at instant of arrest, and instant

of encounter, which statutorly

required patroleman Swin to request appellant yield to a driving under the
influence field sobriety test.
It is a fundamental legal principle that criminal punishment should not be
visited upon the blameless. An illustration of this principle was affirmed in,
State vs Robinson,(Mo t Sup.) 328 S. W. 2d 667,

" If a person commits an act

under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed to him since, in
effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to the act."

Citing, Newman and Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 30 So,
Cal. L. Rev. 313,
And as appellant has stated to this Court he only was attempting to
bestow some kindness upon a fellow human beings when dissent emeraed within
appellants automobile and confronted him with a horrific dilemma between
his passengers. The evidence established at appellants trial assaults anv
other belief or circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to think
that the appellant did not act with regards reflective of compulsion.
Thus, affirming the fact that the appellant established no conditions
which statutorly can be construed as recklessness or negligent under section
41-6-44, justification from appellants 'horrific dilemma1 compels him to
hitch his defense to coercion pursurance to State vs St. Clair, (Mo. Sup.)
262 S. W. 2d 25, 27
11

based upon the following brief arguement,

a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average

member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear."
And appellant hereof respectfully rest the foreqoing issues conveyed
in this laymans arguement.

Dated this

cc: ROGER CUTLER and
RICHARD G. HAMP

pay of October, 1933.

By:
JERRY MCKINLEY ARMSTRONG

